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ABSTRACT 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) provides an interesting cognitive framework 
for the study of how interpretation takes place in face-to-face interaction. However, the 
applicability of this theory extends beyond conversation and this article also outlines how 
grammar can be analysed from a relevance-theoretic perspective. The purpose of this 
article is to provide a review of different studies of grammatical aspects of sentences 
which overlap with more traditional approaches in order to obtain a more accurate and 
context-centred picture of grammar. The extensive bibliography provided will surely be 
useful as a starting point for analysts interested in grammar from a pragmatic perspective. 
1. Relevance theory: a brief overview 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) developed a cognitive approach to interpretation from their 
initial proposal of the unification of Grice's (1975) classic maxims in a single principie of 
relevance. This cognitive theory (RT henceforth) centres around the importance of 
intention and inference in every communicative act. In their approach to intention, Sperber 
and Wilson (S&W henceforth) come cióse to the ideas of Grice (1975) and Strawson 
(1964), among others, about meaning and communication centred on the addressee's 
recognition of the addresser's informative intention, with the help of the parallel 
recognition of the communicative intention underlying that utterance (or stimulus, as S&W 
prefer to cali it). The explicit manifestation of one's intention that something becomes 
manifest for the hearer becomes an ostensive communicative action. Ostensive stimuli 
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must satisfy three requirements: (S&W 1986:153-154): (a) attract the audience's attention; 
(b) focus it on the communicator's intentions; and (c) reveal the communicator's intentions. 
As far as inference is concerned, S&W (1987: 697) think that inference can fill the gap 
between the semantic representation of utterances and the message that each utterance 
eventually communicates. They emphasize the role of the communicators in manifesting 
both their communicative and informative intention with the utterance, while the hearer 
tries to work out different hypotheses as to what the correct interpretation is. With this 
pragmatic approach, S&W avoid traditional views that explained communication as a 
simple, straightforward decoding of the messages encoded by the communicator. 
In their interpretive model, S&W also stress the importance of deduction, which is the 
resultofbringingtogethernewinformation {P} and oídinformation {C} previously stored 
in the hearer's mind. S&W ñame this cognitive operation contextualization (S&W 1986: 
108). This contextualization can produce contextual ejfects. A contextual effect is 
generated when the context is modified in a certain way by the new information. This 
modification of context results in the strengthening or weakening of former assumptions. 
AU this theoretical background is the base on which S&W place the central proposal 
of their theory, which can be summarised in four statements (Wilson 1994: 44): (a) every 
utterance has a variety of possible interpretations, all compatible with the information that 
is linguistically encoded; (b) not all these interpretations occur to the hearer 
simultaneously, some of them take more effort to think up; (c) hearers are equipped with 
a single, general criterion for evaluating interpretations; and (d) this criterion is powerful 
enough to exelude all but at most a single interpretation, so that having found an 
interpretation that fits the criterion, the hearer looks no further. 
In a nutshell, for S&W interpretation depends on the addressee's choice of one 
interpretive hypothesis (among many other possible hypotheses) that is consistent with the 
addresser's communicative intention. This cognitive activity has to do with an enrichment 
of the logical form of the utterance in order to get a propositional form which, depending 
on the role of context, can match the intended interpretation (at the level of explicatures) 
or further contextual accesses may be needed in order to reach the intended implicature 
of the utterance (taken here in a slightly different sense from Grice's). 
However, processing the information underlying ostensive communication is subject 
to risk and effort: the risk of not being completely sure of what assumption, in a range of 
múltiple other assumptions that every communicative activity can produce in the hearer, 
is the one that the speaker wants the hearer to process (Blakemore 1992: 21); and the effort 
of choosing one proposition and processing it, after having compared it to previously 
stored information. This is why every ostensive communicative activity carries the 
guarantee of its relevance, that is, the speaker is aware of the cognitive effort that the 
hearer has to make, and presupposes that despite this, the benefits of the eventual 
interpretation of the utterance are worth this effort. 
From this perspective, we can deduce that different degrees of relevance are generated 
from the fact that every information-processing activity demands a certain amount of 
mental effort from the hearer, and the bigger this effort, the less relevant. In conclusión, 
the definition of relevance can be formulated roughly with two preliminary conditions 
(S&W 1986: 125): 
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Condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual 
effects in this context are large. 
Condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort 
required to process it in this context is small. 
When these two conditions are satisfied, the utterance is consistent with the principie 
of relevance. If the hearer finds a (first) interpretation that satisfies these conditions, the 
process of interpretation will stop at this point. 
2. Relevance theory and grammar: A complementation of traditional views 
S&W's proposal of a balance between interest and effort, which guides hearers in the 
selection of a (first and only) appropriate interpretation of utterances, together with the 
importance of S&W's proposal of an enrichment of the logical form of utterances in the 
search for this interpretation, underlie most of the research on grammar under an RT 
framework. In short, grammatical aspects are no longer intrinsic and relatively stable 
features of language, ñor are grammatical attributes a mere list of choices in hypothetical 
contexts supplied by the grammarian. Instead, a pragmatic and consequently context-
centred view of grammar is proposed in which grammatical attributes constrain (or not) 
the choice of a right (i.e. intended) interpretation. The addressee's ability to access the 
adequate context in which the utterance can be optimally processed also plays an important 
part in the outcome of interpretation (Haegeman, 1987). In this sense, the grammatical 
organization of utterances has an important role throughout this cognitive 
contextualisation, since it often imposes constraints upon the range of possible 
interpretations of the utterance and thus reduces the effort required to select the intended 
interpretation (more on this below). 
3. Studies on grammar from a relevance-theoretic perspective 
Below there is a short review of studies which, one way or another, analyse grammatical 
aspects of language using RT as the main theoretical framework. 
(a) Undoubtedly, one of the most important contributions of RT to the study of 
grammar has resulted from the work by Blakemore (1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 
1990; Brockway, 1981, 1982) on connectives, which has led to a real flow of studies in 
the same direction (see Ariel, 1988; Blass, 1988, 1990, 1993; Gutt, 1988; Haegeman, 
1993; Higashimori, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995, 1997; Itani, 1992; Jucker, 1993; Watts, 
1986; Moeschler, 1989a, 1989b, 1993a; Rouchota, 1990, 1996; Smith and Smith, 1988; 
Unger, forthcoming; W&S, 1993; Fretheim, 1997; Iten, 1997; Takeuchi, 1997). Going 
beyond the traditional approach which tends to a primary distinction between same-level 
relationship of elements (coordination, parataxis) and a hierarchy-based one 
(subordination, hypotaxis), a certain class of connectives including after all, so, but, 
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whereas, etc. are regarded as constraints on relevance, that is, as guidelines for the correct 
comprehension of the compound sentence, since they reduce the effort needed to access 
the correct (i.e. intended) interpretation. In Blakemore's (1987b) words, 
their solé function is to guide the interpretation process by specifying certain properties 
of context and contextual effects. In a relevance-based framework, where the aim is to 
minimise processing costs, the use of such expressions is to be expected. (77) 
Consequently, from this perspective, connectives are used in order to make implicit 
coherence relations explicit (Rouchota, 1996:201), and henee to establish a safe guideline 
for the interpretation of utterances containing them. 
For instance the connective but has two basic meanings: "denial of expectation" and 
"contradiction." In a sentence such as (1) below (Rouchota, 1996: 201), 
(1) He votes Tory but I trust him. 
by using but the speaker indicates that the proposition it introduces is relevant as a denial 
of the expectation created by the proposition expressed in the first clause. 
Also, the connective andis not simply a (neutral) equivalent to the logical conjunction 
operator, and pragmatics has to be able to account to asymmetrical examples such as (2a-c) 
below, in which there is more to the meaning of the sentence than the mere addition of the 
meaning of the two clauses (Carston, 1993): 
(2) (a) He handed her the scalpel and she made the incisión. 
(b) We went to París and I visited several museums. 
(c) I watched TV and I fell asleep. 
From a pragmatic point of view, the relationship between the clauses in the above 
examples is determined via inference and the individual's assumptions, overlapping with 
the parallel decoding of the semantic content of the clauses. For example, for (2a), the 
interpretation (3a) is much more likely to be picked up as the intended interpretation than 
(3b), even though both are, in theory, possible (Carston, ibid:. 29): 
(3) (a) He handed her the scalpel and a second or two later she made the incisión with that 
scalpel. 
(b) He handed her the scalpel and simultaneously she made the incisión with her 
pocketknife. 
Underlying this approach to connectives, there is a basic dichotomy in RT-related 
pragmatic analysis: conceptual vs procedural meanings. In a nutshell, there are two types 
of meaning which have been developed mainly in two áreas: linguistic (having to do with 
truth-conditions) and cognitive (linguistic decoding provides input to the inferential phase 
of comprehension). This second área confirms the existence of conceptual and procedural 
information as used by Blakemore and her followers. In W&S's (1993) words: 
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Inferential comprehension involves the construction and manipulation of conceptual 
representations; linguistic decoding feeds inferential comprehension; linguistic 
constructions might therefore be expected to encode two basic types of information: 
concepts or conceptual representations on the one hand, and procedures for manipulating 
them on the other. (10) 
Blakemore applies this hypothesis to connectives, which should not be seen as 
encoding concepts, but as procedural devices which constrain the inferential phase by 
indicating the kind of cognitive process that the hearer should go through (henee reducing 
the eventual overall effort). 
(b) Smith and Smith (1988), Foster-Cohen (1997) and Noh (1996) have applied RT to 
conditionals. In general, there is some discussion on whether conditionals are similar to 
the logical "implication" or closer to non-truth-functional words relating the antecedent 
and the consequent in the sentence. The gap between these semantic vs pragmatic uses of 
conditionals can be filled using an RT framework. Smith and Smith, for instance, suggest 
that i/is semantically equivalent to the logical implication '—»', and that the behaviour of 
both factual and counterfactual conditionals can be explained in contextual, relevance-
theoretic terms. For example: 
(4) (a) If you are confident enough, bet your whole salary on that horse. 
(b) If I ask you politely, will you post the letter? 
(c) If you are hungry, there is a flan in the fridge. 
In these sentences the hearer has to recover the propositional form of the sentence (via 
enrichment of the logical form) and intégrate it into a description according to the 
imperative {the speaker is telling the speaker to P, as in (4a)), or an interrogative 
connotation, as in (4b), and in both cases there is a guarantee of relevance for the speaker 
and/or hearer. For (4c), Smith and Smith propose the following RT-related explanation: 
the antecedent specifies a state of affairs which, as usual, provides a relevant context for 
the consequent. Given the Principie of Relevance, this in turn forces the listener to make 
certain additional assumptions: specifically, that he can infer from the guaranteed 
relevance of the consequent that the flan in the fridge is available for him. Given the 
easily accessible information that hunger is undesirable, that eating alleviates hunger and 
that flans are for eating, the forcé of the whole conditional is accounted for naturally. 
(335) 
RT is also useful for conditional sentences in which the antecedent contradiets some 
assumption(s) which form(s) part of the context (see Smith and Smith, ibid. 342f). 
(c) Carston (1994), Carston and Noh (1995), and Yoshimura (1992, 1993) analyse 
negation from an RT perspective. Carston and Noh's (1994, 1995) object of analysis is a 
certain variety called metalinguistic negation, in which the speaker pro vides an objection 
to the proposition within the scope of negation, as in (5a-b) below: 
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(5) (a) He isn't neurotic or paranoia; he's both. 
(b) She's not my mother; she's my female progenitor. 
What is at stake here is, again, the truth-functionality of negation. As Carston (1994) 
points out, it is usually assumed that since the more prototypical kind of negation deals 
with truth-conditional contení, this variety of negation used as objection does not. As 
Carston concludes, under RT this variety of negation need not imply a (semantic or 
pragmatic) contradiction of the second clause with respect to the first one. Rather, the 
hearer often reaches the end of the first clause with an adequate enrichment of the kind of 
pragmatic relation linking the two elements in the sentence, so that the follow-up clause 
does not entail a contradiction, but an overall meaningful sense. 
(d) Several analysts have studied modals and modality using a relevance-theoretic 
approach (Berbeira Gardón, 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, forthcoming; Groefsema, 1995; 
Klinge, 1993; Carretero Lapeyre, 1997; Nicolle, 1997a; Papafragou, 1997). They attempt 
to provide a cognitive explanation for the various senses in which modals can be used in 
similar contexts. For example, may has both epistemic and deontic interpretations of (6a) 
in (6b) and (6c) respectively: 
(6) (a) She may do the examination tomorrow. 
(b) It is possible that she will do the examination tomorrow. 
(c) She is permitted to do the examination tomorrow. 
Instead of simply claiming that modal auxiliarles are ambiguous, under RT they are 
considered to have a basic meaning, and the different interpretations which they can 
acquire are dependent on contextual attributes. In other words, there is a basic 
propositional meaning which is later enriched to yield apropositional form with a context-
related (epistemic/deontic) meaning (Berbeira Gardón, 1993: 58). Groefsema (1995: 61) 
goes on to say that "the basic meanings of can, may, must and should express relations 
between the proposition expressed by the rest of an utterance containing them and a set of 
'background' assumptions, while putting constraints on what sets of assumptions are 
recovered during the interpretation process." Klinge (1993), on the other hand, differs 
slightly from this proposal, since he claims that the modals' contribution to the 
interpretation of an utterance is to provide a relation between the proposition expressed 
{situation expression in his terminology) and a state of affairs (or world situatiori). 
(e) Ifantidou-Trouki (1993), Watts (1988), and Bertuccelli-Papi (1996), among others, 
have studied adverbs and adverbials under RT. Ifantidou-Trouki deals with four types of 
adverbials: illocutionary (frankly, confidentially, honestly...), attitudinal {unfortunately, 
happily, sadly...), evidential (evidently, obviously...) and hearsay (allegedly, reportedly). 
They are usually regarded as non-truth-conditional, that is, as not contributing to the 
proposition expressed by the utterance, but as indicators of the type of speech act 
performed with the utterance. The RT-based analysis proves that in reality these kinds of 
adverbials are very different from each other in their use and non-truth-functionality. As 
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it tums out, not all adverbs have a procedural role in the utterances where they occur, 
helping the hearer in their processing, but also encode conceptual representations, even 
though in two types of adverbials (illocutionary, attitudinal) their role is not as essential 
as to contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance as a whole. 
(f) Clark (1993a, 1993b), Lunn (1989), Rouchota (1994a, 1994b) and W&S (1988) 
study moods such as subjunctive and imperative. Clark's concern is pseudo-imperatives. 
These include verbs used with a covert conditional meaning, as in (7a-d) and also the kind-
of-imperative sense of let's in (7e): 
(7) (a) Wash the car and I'll buy you an ice-cream. 
(b) Leave the house or I'll cali the pólice. 
(c) Come one step closer and I'll shoot. 
(d) Turn on the radio and you'll hear the news about the murder. 
(e) Let's go to the cinema tonight. 
Clark claims that RT can explain their grammatical behaviour without any extra 
syntactic or semantic theoretical machinery. Again, the semantic content of the utterance 
has to be combined with contextual information in order to access its intended 
interpretation or, in this case, its eventual pseudo-imperative forcé. For instance, the 
explanation of the "conditional" interpretation of sentences such as (7a-d) is entirely 
pragmatic, and can be explained in relevance-theoretic terms: "in each case the hearer has 
to make some assumption about how desirable the state of affairs is thought to be and from 
whose point of view it is thought to be desirable; in making these assumptions he is guided 
by contextual factors and considerations of optimal relevance" (Clark, 1993a: 82; 1993b: 
174). 
(g) Jucker (1992) unifies the different senses of the definite article proposed by Quirk 
et al. (1985) under RT. In general, the definite article makes reference to some identifiable 
person, object, concept, etc. which acquires promínence in a given context, or it is used 
in anaphoric/cataphoric reference to another word in the sentence or the text concerned, 
among other uses. In general, though, and as S&W acknowledge, hearers can only make 
non-demonstrative assumptions about their interlocutors' own assumptions, and successful 
communication depends on these assumptions being accurate. This, when applied to noun 
phrases, implies that speakers continuously make assumptions about whether their 
interlocutors will manage to identify the intended referent of the noun phrase or not, with 
the following sub-assumption: 
The referent of the expression which contains a definite article is uniquely identifiable 
at the particular point of the discourse at which the expression occurs. (128) 
which is part of the meaning of the definite article and therefore underlies most of the uses 
proposed by Quirk et al. (1985): "the various categorisations of uses of the definite article 
that have been proposed by grammarians in essence try to compartmentalise the bases on 
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which speakers assume that their addressees will be able to pick up the correct referent" 
(ibid., 130). 
See Breheny (1997) for another relevance-theoretic analysis of definites. 
(h) Smith (1990), Haegeman (1989) and Moeschler (1993b) choose tense as the focus 
of grammatical analysis under RT. Smith's hypothesis is that RT provides an ideal 
framework to avoid the ambiguities that arise in logical descriptions of tense. Indeed, in 
RT it is not enough to say that the past tense provides a temporal reference prior to the 
moment of speaking. Instead, the hearer is expected to "narrow the reference down to 
some more specific interval, so that the utterance can be constructed as expressing an 
optimally relevant proposition; that is, so that it can interact with accessible contextual 
assumptions to give rise to a range of effects" (Smith, 1990: 85). Smith goes on to apply 
RT to the sequentiality of the narrative past, in sentences such as the following: 
(8) John entered the office. The president walked over to him. 
.in which the information provided by the second clause is interpreted as preceded in time 
by the one provided by the first clause. Following Carston (1988), Smith concludes that 
this phenomenon is part of 'reference assignment' and consequently part of the 
propositional enrichment to yield an explicature of the sentence. 
Haegeman's analysis focuses on the difference between going to and will, in an attempt 
to overeóme the intuitive distinction of these auxiliaries in examples such as (9a-b) below: 
(9) (a) I will/shall leave next week. 
(b) I'm going to leave next week. 
Her claim is that at the level of sentence meaning, the meaning of both auxiliaries is 
equivalent, and that the difference is to be found in the constraints that they impose on the 
processing in context of the utterance in which they oceur. In her study she applies the 
conceptual/procedural distinction outlined above to conclude that 
Be going to... imposes a constraint on the processing of the proposition with which 
it is associated. It signáis that this proposition is relevant in a context including at least 
some present tense propositions, or, in other words, it guarantees a contextual effect if 
the utterance is processed against a present context. Will, on the other hand, signáis that 
the hearer should extend the immediately accessible (present) context for the processing 
of the proposition and should process the utterance against future propositions. (305) 
This proposal is then applied to these auxiliaries in combination with ellipsis and 
conditionals, among other relevant aspeets of their use. For discussion, see also Nicolle 
(1997b). 
(i) Zegarac (1889, 1990, 1993) turns to aspect under a relevance-theoretic approach. 
Starting off with a traditional classification of aspect and situation types, he concludes that 
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under RT these traditional labels seem problematic. For example, in the case of stative 
verbs, which cannot be used in the progressive aspect, many instances are found which are 
clear exceptions to this rule (1989: 24, 1990: 127): 
(10) (a) Peter is being polite. 
(b) Mary is loving the fruit salad. 
In this case, the hearer realises that (10a) and (10b) are not in tended to be interpreted 
literally, and starts looking for assumptions about what the speaker might have intended 
to convey. 
Basically, the heart of the matter lies in the quality of the encyclopaedic entries for the 
verbs concerned and the hearer's accessibility to contexts in which the stative meaning of 
the verbs is eventually created. Some examples by Zegarac (1990: 129) are particularly 
illustrative: 
(11) (a) John doesn't feel well. 
(b) John isn't feeling well. 
(12) (a) The baby resembles her mother. 
(b) The baby is resembling her mother more and more. 
(c) ?? The baby is resembling her mother. 
(13) (a) Antoinette understands Russian. 
(b) Antoinette is understanding Russian better and better. 
(c) ?? Antoinette is understanding Russian. 
Quoting Zegarac, 
The meaning of the progressive is to be defined in terms of reference to instantiation(s) 
of the property denoted by the predicate, and the predicates in [11] to [13] take the 
progressive. However, 'feel well' does so more readily than the predicates 'resemble 
one's mother' and 'understand Russian', acceptable only in [12b] and [13b], with explicit 
indications of change ('more and more', 'better and better')... [T]he difference in the 
degree of semantic markedness between the progressive form of 'feel', on the one hand, 
and 'resemble' and 'understand Russian' on the other, would be seen [under RT] not as 
a difference in the degree of 'stativity' or 'dynamicness' inherent in the meanings of 
these verbs, but as a difference in the accessibility of contexts in which [they] as 
instantiated in the form of events achieve adequate contextual effects. Thus [12c] and 
[13c] are marginal because they require... too much processing effort on the part of the 
hearer to construct the assumptions necessary for the contextualisation of the utterance. 
(29) 
(j) Ziv (1997) and Rubovitz (1997) choose relative clauses as the focus of analysis. 
Ziv's analysis concentrates on a particular variety of relative clauses: extraposed ones, in 
sentences such as (14a-b) 
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(14) (a) People can get sick who do not eat well. 
(b) Athletes must be quite strong who can lift such heavy weights. 
Ziv's claim is that there is a systematic dependence between the propositions expressed 
by the constituent clauses of the sentence containing the extraposed relative clause, 
whereas such restriction does not hold for sentences with non-extraposed ones, and this 
fact is easily explainable using RT. After a characterisation of background and foreground 
material in terms of relevance, Ziv concludes that extraposed relative clauses convey 
foreground material which is striking and non-predictable, and therefore likely to yield a 
number of non-trivial contextual implicatures (in plain words, likely to be relevant). The 
attempt to underline the informative importance of that material would justify, to a certain 
extent, the anomalous grammatical construction in these sentences. 
(k) Other analysts (Kempson 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Foster-Cohen, 1994; Smith, 1989) 
have approached the current generative approaches to grammar, such as Government and 
Binding and Minimalism, using RT. This is the case of the analysis of anaphora and the 
binding of pronouns by Kempson and Foster-Cohen, or the RT approach to syntactic 
parameters by Smith. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this article I have reviewed different attempts to study grammatical aspects of sentences 
with the help of S&W's relevance theory. In many of these studies, some grammatical 
points, which were regarded as problematic by traditional approaches, are now explained 
in a more accurate way with the greater importance given to contextual features that RT 
analysts usually provide. As suggested above, rather than a substitution of former views 
on grammar, RT overlaps succesfully with them and the outcome is a better picture of how 
language works. Judging by the increasing number of studies which are proposed with RT 
as their underlying framework, we can conclude that this approach is basically correct and 
appealing. It will come as no surprise that new grammatical aspects are analysed under RT 
in search of a better picture of how grammar works. 
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